Residential users get most of their preferred content (e.g., films, news) from their wireless access point, which is connected to content providers through one or several network providers. Nowadays, these access points have enough storage and wireless transmission capacities to distribute the content to neighboring access points if required and allowed by the user. Based on this concept, this paper considers a hybrid content distribution model in peer-to-peer content deliver networks. A user or peer in this network can get its content either directly from the content provider (CP), or from a neighboring user who has this content stored and is willing to share it. Two types of users are considered: premium users are the users getting always the content directly from the CP, and standard user are the users getting the content from other standard users, when possible, otherwise from the CP. Furthermore, standard user share their content to other users if required. This paper studies the pricing problem of the CP such that there are enough standard users to distribute the content (using less network resources and reducing significantly the delay) while maximizing the CP benefits. We address the problem from a game theoretic approach and evaluate when the Nash Equilibrium can be attained. The obtained case have been applied to a real life study using a BBC iPlayer dataset and an analysis on the CP benefits dependence on different parameters. Finally we extend this pricing model when considering also the reduction of load on its content custodian (server) and discuss how the pricing policy is affected.
I. INTRODUCTION
Throughout the last decades, the media industry is shifting from delivering content via physical medium to digital medium. After the commercialization of Internet in 1994, there has been an exponential growth in digital media content delivery services [1] . According to a CISCO report [2] , almost 84% of the internet traffic will be video content by the end of this year (2019).
In the media distribution industry, the three most important players are: 1) Content provider (CP), such as Netflix, is the owner of the content and takes care of its distribution. CP has full control over the content and is solely responsible to determine all the attributes (such as pricing and distribution policy) related to the content. 2) Network provider (NP), such as Deutsche Telekom, owns the network that delivers the content from the CP servers to the users.
3) Content consumer, i.e., users, download and use (e.g., listens, watches) the content. Users pay for the content and acquire it from CP through a NP. Primarily, there are three types of content distribution models: centralized, decentralized and hybrid. The centralized model is implemented as a client-server system where the content placement, content pricing and customer relationships are centrally managed by the CP without being biased by users. CP can set or change the price of the content and distribution policy according to its own strategy. To get the content, a user has to buy it with a price set by CP. The disadvantage of this model is that, as the content is available only in CP's server, the load on CP's server remains very high all the time if it is a popular content. Also, when the server is multiple hops away from the user, the latency for content delivery increases.
The second model is the decentralized model, which is implemented as a peer-to-peer (P2P) network where the users participate into the process of content distribution by trading content [3] . In this case, a user can store the downloaded content in any cache-enabled home device (e.g., Apple TV) and share it with other users who are interested in the same content. The advantage of this model is that it reduces the load of the CP's servers up to a certain extent [4] . However, the disadvantage from the CP perspective is that the CP is not the sole owner of the content. Thus, while determining the price of the content, the CP has to take user's preferences into account.
A hybrid content distribution model is a combination of both centralized and decentralized models [5] . In this model, a user can choose whether to get the desired content in the centralized or the decentralized way, that is, directly from CP or from other users. The price of the content is different in these two cases. From the perspective of CP, this model finds a compromise between centralized and decentralized model: it reduces the load on CP's server up to some extent, but at the same time, CP looses control on the content pricing and distribution. From user perspective, this model offers user the choice on where to get the content from and how much price user pays for it.
In this paper, for the sake of clarity but without losing generality, we refer to a hybrid content distribution model based on the Wi-Fi enabled content sharing architecture [6] , [7] . In this architecture, users are connected to the CP through a fixed network provided by NP and also to other used through Wi-Fi technology. In this hybrid model, CP offers the users two options: Premium and Standard, which correspond to the centralized and distributed content distribution models respectively. If a user selects the Premium option, he/she can directly download the content from the CP's server and he/she does not have to store it nor share it with other users. In this case, the CP has the responsibility of delivering the content, which involves various costs for CP, as for example, the fee to the NP. On the other hand, if a user selects the Standard option, he/she must check the availability of the content with other Standard users before requesting CP for it. If the content is available with any other Standard user, the content delivery takes place from one user to another user and does not incur any cost to the CP. It can be safely assumed that a user selecting the Standard option always agrees to share any stored content and has all necessary devices and infrastructure.
Motivation: Based on our previous works [6] , [7] on a content placement strategy from the perspective of CP in a hybrid content distribution model, we provide in this paper a content pricing policy from the perspective of CP to achieve a viable and advantageous pricing for both CP and users.
In the hybrid content distribution model, from the user perspective, selecting the Standard option is the cheapest choice but may not be the best one. For example, if we consider a hybrid video sharing architecture [6] , [7] , a user may not be able to watch HD videos when selecting the Standard option as it depends on the link capacity and availability between users. The same user will be able to do so when selecting the Premium option. So the choice of selecting Premium or Standard option entirely depends on the user's willingness to pay for the content and the content itself. So, it is difficult for CP to predict accurately which option a user will choose and hence, which pricing policy the user will consider. Now, both Premium and Standard options have advantage and disadvantage from the perspective of CP. If more users select the Premium option, the revenue of the CP increases but at the same time, the load on the CP's server also increases, which causes an increase of the maintenance cost and energy consumption. On the other hand, if more users select the Standard option, the load on the CP's server reduces, but also the revenue generated by CP decreases. Our main target is to propose a pricing policy from the perspective of a CP, which is robust against the uncertainty of the number of users choosing the Premium and Standard options. Although this pricing policy has been developed having the Wi-Fi enabled content sharing architecture [6] , [7] in mind, it is to be noted that it is valid for any kind of hybrid content distribution network.
Our contribution: The main contributions of this paper are:
• Find the price of the content when the benefits of both, CP and users, are maximized and the equilibrium is obtained when possible. • Identify the conflicts of interest between CPs and users, and determine the cases where an agreement between them is feasible. In those cases, the price is determined by the Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS).
• Apply the proposed solution in a real case study (using real life data in UK) to observe the impact of the different parameters in the pricing policy. • Extend the pricing model to include the load reduction on CP's server. To the best of our knowledge, this work is the first one to introduce an NBS based pricing policy for a hybrid digital content distribution system.
The paper has been organized as follows: we discuss prior research works related to digital content distribution in Section 2. In Section 3 we elaborate the problem, we study in the paper, with example. In Section 4 we discuss three different cases and propose a pricing policy in each case. We also incorporate a study based on real life data for analyzing the pricing policy in Section 5. As an extension of the discussed pricing model, we also include another important parameter (load reduction on CP's server) and update the pricing policy in Section 6 with concluding the paper in Section 7.
II. RELATED WORK
There have already been previous research works on the pricing of digital content in centralized ( [8]-[12]) and decentralized distribution models ( [13]- [15] ), but there is no prior research work on the hybrid distribution model addressed in this paper.
Several works have addressed digital content pricing in centralized distribution model. For example, in [8] the authors explore about Music as a Service and find out that next to price, contract duration and product qualities are two most important product attributes. Their research also studies configurations on consumers' utility and their willingness to pay for premium offers. The paper [9] compares between two business models. In the first, free of access is provided with low product quality and advertisements, while in the second the access is charged and product is of high quality. It has been shown that if the users are advertisement tolerant, the first policy is more profitable than the second one. Researchers in [10] studied the same thing and showed that companies are better off providing both pricing and advertising options to consumers. They suggested that as advertisement revenue rate increases, advertising level should be kept low and based on the factors that affect the price and advertising decisions, they derived the optimal price and advertising level. In [11] , two kind of policies -fee based and free with advertisement, were studied in detail and was shown that the mix group that uses both free and fee strategies are the most profitable ones. In [12] the authors analyzed the pricing schemes and DRM (digital right management) protection policy with respect to different collaborative market structures. As the piracy is closely associated with the objects and the distribution channel, they also examine the impact of content quality and network effects on the development of strategies based on all these factors. But this is a model for host centric network only, no discussion for peer-to-peer networks.
Significant research has also been conducted on digital content pricing in decentralized model also. In [13] the researchers proposed a game theory based pricing policy for job allocation in mobile grid networks. They introduced a game theoretic framework to obtain pricing model between a Wireless Access Point server and a mobile device. Along with that, they also introduced a game theory based workload allocation scheme for the mobile devices to maximize the revenue. In [14] the authors proposed a lottery based P2P pricing scheme. This model provides higher revenue for peers who intend to participate and contribute with other peers and higher cost for those who choose to behave selfishly. But the service provider is not included in the game, so the pricing policy of the content provider is not taken into account. The paper [15] compares between two models of digital content distribution -client-server model and peer-topeer model. They described a monopolistic pricing scheme for distributing digital content over peer-to-peer networks that rewards peer users who participate in the distribution process and showed that peer-to-peer model is more profitable if pricing mechanism provides strong incentives to users to share content.
All the previous research works described above are based on the pricing and distribution of digital content in centralized and decentralized content distribution model. To the best of our knowledge, this work is the first one providing a game theoretic pricing policy in a hybrid content distribution model, i.e., where a user can choose either the centralized or the decentralized model to get the content.
III. PROBLEM STATEMENT
In this section, the pricing problem considered in this paper is formulated. At first we discuss the background necessary for formulation of this problem. Then objective functions are defined, constraints are discussed and a detailed example is given for better understanding.
A. Background
As stated earlier, the content distribution network usually involves three players to deliver the content, as shown in Fig.  1 : content provider (CP), network provider (NP) and the user (referred also as content customer (CC)). Let us consider a content distribution model of a single CP, a single or multiple NPs and multiple users. All users are connected to the CP via fixed network(s) provided by NP(s). If there are multiple NPs in the model, we assume that each NP charges the same amount of money (pn) to CP. In addition to that, every user is connected to his/her neighboring user(s) via Wi-Fi and is reachable by every other user in single or multiple hops.
Let us denote x to be the total number of users who get a particular content c from CP. These users can select one of the following two options: 
B. Objective Functions
In this paper, we formulate a bargaining framework only among those who already own c and who can share it with others. The users, who do not own the content, have no leverage for bargaining and they are kept outside of the bargaining framework. Similarly, as a Premium user does not share content, no Premium user can take part in the bargaining. As it is a connected network, we also assumed that the Standard user who gets the content first is the only one to share it with other interested Standard users. The problem that we want to address is to find the content costs pb, p J b and sharing discount pu such that benefits for the user (Benuser) and for the CP (BenCP ) are maximised. Benefits are defined as the difference between revenues and costs. For a given content c, both BenCP (·) and Benuser(·) can be given by the following only one user watches the content, i.e., x = 1. Hence, this user cannot share the content with any other user. In this case, the total benefit of CP BenCP will be limited to
As the CP would always aim at generating positive benefit, the following constraint should hold 
equations (derivation of these equations are given in the next Section):
xj Let us describe the proposed hybrid content distribution model with an example. Let us consider a new content c of size f Bytes that has been introduced by the CP at a certain point of time t0. We also consider a group of x = 4 users u2, u3, u4 who are interested in c and among them, user u4 is the only Premium user (i.e., y = 1). Let us present the exchange of messages when the first user (u3) requires
where αj and = 1, user j gets content as Premium user 0, otherwise t 1 : At this time instant, u3 decides to download c. As u3 is a Standard user, he/she has to check the availability of c with other Standard users (in this case, u1 and u2). So, u3 sends request to both u1 and u2 to check if c is available at any of them. t 2 : As c is not available with u1 or u2, both of them send βj = 1, Standard user j is the first one to get the content 0, otherwise negative response to u3. t 3 : u3 then sends a request to CP to download c directly from CP's server as c is not available with any other Standard and f is the size of content c. Throughout this paper we consider a particular content c and the parameters associated with c are summarized in Table I . The problem should be solved for any content offered to the customers and hence, the price will depend on the number of premium and standard users for each content. If, at a later point of time t7 > t6, u1 wants to download c, u1 can get it from either u2 or u3. To make our model simple, we always consider that the first Standard user getting the content, will always share it. In this example, u3 shares c among the other Standard users, not u2. How the pricing policy changes when multiple users share the same content, i.e., when u2 also shares c, is a part of future research direction. Also, nowadays, users have contracts with local network providers, in order to guarantee their connectivity to get internet access. That is why, in our model, we ignore the price a user has to pay to the NP just to download one media at one point of time. Furthermore, users also have contracts to one or more CP in order to get access to the content portfolio they offer (either their own content or from other CP as e.g., MGM), but in this paper we only focus on the interaction between a single CP and the users. A more complex model with multiple CPs and multiple users is another part of future research direction."
The parameters associated with this content distribution model are listed in Table I . In the most general case, we can assume that among all the users who download c, some users opt for the Premium option and some others for the Standard option, like the case we described in the previous example. In this example, only CP and u3 own c and can share it, so the bargaining will be only between CP and u3. In that case, BenCP = f.pb + 2.f.p J b 2.f.pn f.pu and Benuser = Benu 3 = f.pu f.p J b f.s. From the expressions of BenCP and Benu 3 we observe that CP gets more benefit when more users download the content , and u3 gets more benefit when he/she shares the content with more number of Standard users. The main goal of both the CP and u3 is to maximize their benefits, i.e., finding max BenCP ( ) and max Benuser( ) respectively. Based on the values of x and y, three cases can arise which are discussed in the next Section.
IV. PROPOSED PRICING POLICY
There can be three possible scenarios based on the value of y:
• scenario 1: y = 0, all of the x users select Standard option. One user gets the content from the server and the others (i.e., x − 1) get the content from the first user. • scenario 2: y = x, i.e., all of the x users select the Premium option. • scenario 3: 0 < y < x, (as shown in Fig. 2 for the particular case of x=7 and y=3). This is the most general case.
In this Section, we consider each scenario separately and maximize BenCP i ( ) and Benuser i ( ), where BenCP i ( ) and Benuser i ( ) denote the benefit of CP and user respectively in the i-th scenario with i 1, 2, 3 . While doing so, we also calculate the values of pb, p J b and pu in each scenario and check if equilibrium (a settlement of price to which both CP and user agree) can be obtained in each scenario.
A. Case 1 : y = 0
In this case, all of the x users select the Standard option. This option promotes content sharing and hence, we assume that one user gets the content from the server, and the remaining x 1 get the content directly from him/her. 1) CP: In this case, the CP has to deliver the content to at least one user from whom all the remaining x 1 users can share. The revenue of the CP is f.p J b.x. The cost to deliver the content to one user is f.pn. Furthermore, the CP has to give a reward to the user who is sharing the content with other interested users and thus helping in the distribution of the content. The amount of the reward is f.pu per sharing. So, the total amount of reward CP has to give is is f.pu.(x 1) as the content is shared (x 1) times. So, in this case the total benefit generated by CP is :
2) User: When a user downloads the content, it has to pay a price of f.p J b to the CP. The user also has to pay for the energy consumed while sharing the content with x 1 users, which is given by f. s.(x 1) . On the other hand, the user gets the reward from the CP, which is f.pu.(x 1) for sharing the content (x 1) times.
So, the total benefit of the user can be expressed by
It is important to note that selecting the Standard option while getting a content, gives to the user a chance to have positive benefit. This should motivate the user to choose this option over Premium option, which always generates a negative benefit.
3) Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS):
Here we propose a bargaining between CP and users in a situation where:
• the value of x ≥ 2, • there is a conflict of interest on agreement, and • there is a possibility of concluding a mutually beneficial agreement. Considering f and pn to be constant in this particular game, we can see from Eq. 2 that BenCP 1 is maximized when the function FCP 1 = (p J b.x pu.(x 1)) is maximized. From Eq. 3, we also see that Benuser 1 is maximized when the following function Fuser1 = (pu.(x 1) p J b) is maximized.
To maximize BenCP 1 , if the value of p J b is increased and the value of pu is decreased, value of Benuser 1 decreases. On the other hand, to maximize Benuser 1 , if the value of pu is increased and the value of p J b is decreased, the value of BenCP 1 decreases. This is a classic bargaining problem and by using Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS), each of them can settle to a value which lies exactly in the middle of their interests. So, in this case, to attain equilibrium, both CP and user should settle to a value of
2) User: The cost associated to the user selecting the Standard option and sharing the content with the remaining
. On the other hand, instead of FCP 1 and F user1 respectively. Thus, at equilibrium, benefits in this case can be expressed by: FCP 1 = Fuser 1 = Feq 1 . It is to noted that the value of
So, substituting the new values of FCP 1 and F user1 to Eq.
3) NBS: In this case, BenCP 3 is maximized when FCP 3 = 2 and Eq. 3 respectively, the benefits of CP and user become
and Fuser 3 , using NBS equilibrium can be obtained the Now, BenCP 1 and Benuser 1 are in equilibrium. By increasing the value of the same parameter (p J b ), both BenCP 1 and of CP and user are:
4) Settlement of Price:
We have already seen from Eq. 1 that p J b > pn. We also know that pn > 0 and the value of Σ both CP and users are now at equilibrium, as both Ben is maximum. We use Lagrange multiplier [16] to obtain the and Benuser 1 are maximized when Feq 1 is maximized. 
The maximum is obtained by setting the derivatives (Eq. 8) to zero. of CP is: BenCP 2 = f.(pb pn).x.
2) User: In this scenario, user pays a price of f.pb and does not generate any revenue, hence, the benefit of user in and this is again a bargaining situation as described in Section IV-A3, equilibrium can be obtained when pb = 0, which is in Eq. 10, we get f.(x y 1) = f.y , i.e., x = 1, which contradicts the basic condition as we already stated that lowest possible value of x in this case is 2. This proves that we cannot very unrealistic.
As no realistic equilibrium (settlement of price) is not possible, CP selects the value of pb and have a maximum value for F y ≥ 1, x > y and pb > p J b . eq3 with the constraints x ≥ 2, the upper limit on this value can be set based on the customer's willingness to pay for the content. From the perspective of CP, to have a positive benefit, pb should be set at greater than pn.
C. Case 3 : x > y > 0
Let us discuss how BenCP 3 varies in a simple example. Let us define r as the ratio between Premium and Standard service costs, i.e., r = p b = m . Obviously, r > 1. Let us define as p b k, the percentage of users getting the Premium service, i.e., y = k.x. In this case, BenCP 3 can be expressed as This is the most general case, where from a group of x users, y users select the Premium option and the remaining x y select the Standard option. Here, as y > 0, so the lowest possible value of y is y = 1 and as x > y, the lowest possible value of x is x = 2.
1) CP: The total costs of CP in this case is: f.pn.y+f.pn + f.pu(x − y − 1).
CP generates a revenue of f.pb.
Let us evaluate the dependence of BenCP 3 with respect r, k and x. We use cost units (c.u.) as the basic unit of the pn cost when transmitting f = 1 Byte. In all the simulations we assume x = 10 and n = 2 unless stated otherwise. Fig. 4a shows the variation of BenCP 3 with respect k and benefit of CP in this case is:
r. It can be observed that for small k, i.e., small number of Premium users, r does not influence the benefits. However, as the percentage of Premium users increases, the impact of r is maximized when pb is minimum. As other hand, Benuser (5)
(4) is maximized. As there is again a conflict of interest between
Benuser 1 = f. same way as described in Section IV-A3. Proceeding the same way as described in Section IV-A3, the equilibrium benefits Benuser 1 can be increased and there is no conflict of interest anymore.
. We randomly select 100 users from them and study their Fig. 4 : BenCP 3 dependence for varying parameters in a simple scenario.
also increases (the higher r, the higher the increase). Fig. 4c evaluates BenCP 3 with respect k and x for r = 2. The figure • When m < 2, the value of Eq. 12 is still greater than 0 if shows that x plays a major role since even for low k values, the benefits increases significantly with x and they do not vary
substantively with k. Lastly, Fig. 4b depicts the benefits for different r and x values, keeping k = 0.5. It can be observed that small x limits the benefits independently of r. However, for large numbers of users, the benefits increases and more significantly, for high r values.
As n > 1, 2m > 3 or m > 1.5. Thus, the value of Eq. 12 is greater than 0 when m > 1.5. • When m 1.5, 2m <= 3. As we already saw in the previous step, the value of Eq. 12 is greater than 0 when 2m > (n + 2). Combining these two conditions we get D. Comparison among Ben , Ben & Ben (n + 2) ≤ 3 or n ≤ 1, which directly violates Eq. 1.
CP1 CP2 CP3
Thus, we can see that for m > 1.5, BenCP 2 is always greater When a user gets the content directly from server, the load on the server increases and CP also has to take care of the content delivery, which includes a lot of other costs. On the other hand, when users share content among them, CP does than BenCP 1 .
Similarly, subtracting BenCP 3 from BenCP 2 , we get, where m and n are considered to be positive real numbers with m > n (as we already assumed pb > p J b at an earlier point) and n > 1 (as we already know from Eq. 1 that p J b > pn).
Considering these values in the benefit of CP, given in Eq. 4, it can be expressed as Thus, BenCP 2 > BenCP 3 holds when 2m > (n + 2), which is same as Eq. 13. From these calculations in this section, we can conclude that for m > 1.5, BenCP 2 is the highest among BenCP 1 , BenCP 2 and BenCP 3 .
V. REAL LIFE STUDY
To study our proposed solution in a real life scenario, we consider a peer-to-peer content distribution network formed by
Wi-Fi signals [7] . We use a real life dataset of the BBC iPlayer, which is one of the most popular catch-up TV services in the Let us compare this benefit with the benefit that the CP would get in Case 2 (BenCP 2 ). Subtracting BenCP 1 from BenCP 2 , we get UK, used by over 60% of the total population. We analyze the content access pattern using BBC iPlayer trace file of July 2014 which consists of around 215 million sessions from 25 
content access history. Out of the 100 users we select, we assume x among them use premium option and the rest of them use standard option, where x can vary between 0 and Let us find the values of m for which the value of Eq. 12 is greater than 0:
• As m > n, when m 2, the value of Eq. 12 is greater than 0.
100. We randomly select x number of users from the set of 100 users, do this random selection in a confidence interval of 95% and plot the benefit of the CP for various values of x. The benefit is expressed as f.pn.10 9 where f = 1GB. From Fig. 5 we see that when the value of n increases,
Scenario
BenCP LR the benefit of the CP also increases, because both pb and p J b becomes much greater than pn. Also, from all plots in Fig.  5 we see that when the value of r is low, i.e., the value of pb and p J b are within close range of each other, the benefit of the CP gradually decreases when the percentage of premium user increases because as the percentage of standard users is decreasing, content sharing among them is also reducing while the cost to put the content at one user remains the same, which in return reduces the overall benefit of the CP. But when the percentage of standard users becomes 0, there is no cost invloved for the CP to put the content, and that is why we notice a sharp increase in the benefit between y = 90 and y = 100. From these plots it is obvious that the higher the value of n gets, the more benefit CP gets. Also, if CP wants to make profit independent of the percentage of premium users, the value of r should be greater than or equal to 4. We also observe that the benefit of the CP is maximum when the percentage of premium users is highest (100%). So, from the perspective of CP, the most profitable content distribution model is when he and only he has the control over his content and he can determine the price accordingly. But the problem with this centralized content distribution model has already been discussed in Section I. That is why in the next Section we try to trade off between these two model and obtain the revised pricing policy taking these factors into account.
VI. EXTENSION OF PRICING POLICY
The CP has two main important objectives to consider:
• maximize the benefits (BenCP ), and • minimize the load on the server (LR).
x−y−1 The benefit of CP and the load reduction on the server for the three previous cases presented in Section IV, have been summarized in Table II. CP has to prioritize one of these two objectives, because as we have already seen in Section IV-D, the benefit for CP is maximum when m > 1.5, and in that scenario, reduction of load on the server is minimum (i.e., LR = 0%). The lesser the load on the server, the lesser is the maintenance cost. Let us then assume, for simplicity, a proportional model of the extra benefits with respect the load reduction: A load reduction of a factor of g, implies an increase of CP's benefit equal to φg, where φ > 0 is the proportionality constant. At the end of this section we discuss how the value of φ can be calculated.
Let us also assume that CP wants to balance between these two factors, and accordingly the CP gives weights α and β to benefits and load respectively, such that α + β = 1. In this way, the CP wants to maximize his utilization by maximizing the following target function TFCP = α.BenCP + β.φ.LR. The value of the weights -α and β, are to be determined by only CP. Let us consider three cases based on the value of α and β: Benefit (in f. pn. Benefit (in f. pn. Benefit (in f. pn.
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Benefit (in f. pn. In this case, CP only aims at reducing the load on its server.
Putting this value of p J b in Eq. 16 we get pb = 2 βφ . Hence, the values of pb and p J b are independent of x. Also, According to Table II , the load reduction is maximized in Scenario 2 and minimized for Scenario 1.
This case is considered when the CP wants to maximize the benefit. This case is the one discussed in detail in Section IV, along with the pb and p J b values for the three different scenarios.
C. Case 3: α > 0, β > 0 and α + β = 1
In Section IV we discussed the values of pb and p J b in three different cases. However, when CP launches a new media content, CP does not know in advance the values of x and y. So, CP should have such a policy such that the value of its T FCP always remains the same and the value if independent of the values of x and y. It happens only if the value of the T FCP is same in all of the three cases.
If we equalize the TFCP of Case 1 and Case 2, we get:
Based on the value of p J b , once the values of f , pn, α and β are known, the value of φ can also be easily calculated.
VII. CONCLUSION
We considered a digital media delivery system consisting of two main players: user and Content Provider (CP). CP launches the content in his digital platform so that users get it either directly from the server or from another user who has already downloaded it. Based on the number of users using each option, we considered three different cases and determine the price of the content in each case. We used Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS) to determine the prices and discussed if equilibrium can be obtained in each case. We considered CP to have mainly two objectives: maximizing the benefit and reducing the load on the server. The load on the server can be reduced if users share content among themselves. In this paper we provided a pricing policy from the perspective
x (15) of CP in three different cases based on the priority of CP.
There are a few directions in which this work can be further extended. In the peer-to-peer network model, we considered Similarly equalizing the TFCP of Case 2 to Case 3 and combining it with Eq. 15, we obtain only one user would cache the content and would share with others. As a next step, multiple content caching and pb = p J b + 2pn 2βφ + αfx (16) sharing scenario can be considered. Also, we considered in the standard option, a user always gets the content from another
As pn > 0, β > 0, α > 0 and f > 0, pb > p J b , which is the basic motivation of our solution to pursue more users to choose the standard option. If we consider that the large number of users get the content, i.e., large value of x, we can approximate user. It can be also studied how the pricing varies when the user does not always get the content from another user, instead he has to get it directly from the server. [9] T. P. Thomes. An economic analysis of online streaming music services.
x Information Economics and Policy, 25(2):81-91, 2013.
As the value of x is quite high, we can write x − 1 ≈ x and x + 1 ≈ x. After rearranging the terms, we find 
